Why So Few Politicians Speak Up for PBMs

Below a subway platform, beside the two rails that guide the trains, there is a third rail. It carries the power that moves the train, and touching it can kill you. Politics borrowed the term “third rail” for positions elected officials learn not to touch.

Speaking up for PBMs has come close to being a third rail. Attacking them costs a politician next to nothing, and politicians in both parties do it. Defending them is much rarer, though a few members of Congress from both parties have done so.

Where the constituencies are

Unlike hospitals or independent pharmacies, PBMs have little or no visible local constituency. A member of Congress hears from interests that are present in the district. There is at least one hospital in every congressional district, and hospitals are often among the largest employers in their communities. Few candidates run against the hospital back home. Independent pharmacies are on the corner, their owners know the local legislator, and their employees vote in the district. Their trade association, NCPA, brought hundreds of pharmacists to Washington in the spring of 2025 to visit more than 280 congressional offices in two days.

A PBM manages drug benefits nationally, negotiating with manufacturers and pharmacies and administering formularies and networks, but most of that work has no visible presence in a congressional district. The three largest are based in a few places: CVS Caremark in Woonsocket, Rhode Island; Express Scripts in St. Louis; and Optum Rx in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. Of the few members of Congress who have made the case for PBMs, two come from those states: Rhode Island Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse and Missouri Rep. Eric Burlison. But geography does not determine a politician’s position. Burlison’s district, in southwest Missouri, does not include St. Louis, and Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley is among the leading PBM critics in Congress. A parent company’s stores or clinics in a district do not create a visible constituency for the PBM’s work. A member who criticizes a PBM hears little about it from constituents, because in most districts relatively few constituents work for a PBM.

Where the money is

PBMs also face a disadvantage in lobbying resources, at least where it can be measured. In 2025, PhRMA, the drug manufacturers’ trade association, reported about $38 million in federal lobbying expenses — more than twice the roughly $14 million reported by PCMA, the PBMs’ trade association. That is a comparison of trade associations, not industries; the largest PBMs sit inside insurers and retailers whose lobbying cannot be separated by line of business. Yet lobbying expenditures do not necessarily correspond to political influence. NCPA reported only about $1.3 million in federal lobbying expenses in 2025, despite the considerable political influence of independent pharmacists.

Political scientists Richard Hall and Alan Deardorff describe lobbying less as buying positions or changing minds than as a subsidy to legislators who already agree. Lobbyists supply information, intelligence, and staff work that help their natural allies pursue their own goals. A subsidy needs someone to subsidize. Pharmacy owners and employees are constituents who can organize and press for support. A PBM arrives in Washington with resources but few constituents visibly organized behind it.

Who organizes

In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson explained why some interests organize more easily than others. A small group whose members each have a large stake has a strong reason to organize, and a few members can coordinate more easily than many. A large group whose members each have a small stake has a weaker reason, even when the group’s combined stake is large.

In PBM policy, each pharmacy has a large stake and each plan member has a small one. A pharmacy’s payment for covered prescriptions depends directly on the terms of its PBM contracts, giving pharmacies strong reasons to organize. They have organized, and laws restricting PBM practices have passed in state after state. A PBM can produce substantial savings for a plan — but the plan sponsor largely decides how those savings are used. Individual plan members may benefit without recognizing what they gained or having a reason to organize around those savings.

Purchasers, on the other hand, have a reason to organize around PBM savings. An employer, a union health fund, or a state employees’ plan holds those savings in one budget, and someone answers for that budget. Purchasers do not always side with PBMs, and some employer groups have backed PBM reform. But a purchaser that sees a bill as a threat to its savings has a reason to speak up. In Missouri, where PBM reform has failed seven years in a row, a carpenters’ union opposed the latest bill because its health plan spreads the savings across all its members, and the state Chamber of Commerce opposed it as well — putting labor and employers on the same side.

Who speaks up

Mitt Romney, then a Republican senator from Utah, most clearly made the case against banning a PBM pricing arrangement, and he made it for employers. In May 2023, the Senate health committee took up a PBM bill that banned spread pricing, an arrangement in which the plan pays the PBM a set price for each drug and the PBM pays the pharmacy separately. Romney objected. “A vast majority of small and middle-sized employers prefer spread price contracting because it’s lower cost and more certainty for them,” he said. “That’s why they choose it.” His amendment would have kept that option while requiring PBMs to offer every plan sponsor at least one other kind of contract. “Why not let consenting entities decide what’s the best contract for them,” he asked, “instead of having us as government step in and say you can’t contract the way you want to?”

Romney was not speaking up for PBMs as an industry. He was speaking up for the employers and unions that hire them and for their freedom to choose the PBM contract they think works best. He was not asking Congress to leave PBMs alone, either: His amendment paired that choice with more transparency and a required alternative. PBMs manage drug benefits for plan sponsors, and the purchaser chooses among the contracting arrangements available to it. A rule that bans a PBM pricing arrangement also limits what the purchaser can choose. That is the part of the story a PBM finds hardest to tell, because telling it means pointing at its own customers. Romney could tell it, because he was speaking for the customers.

Burlison, a Republican, made the purchaser’s case from his own experience. He once sat on the board of the state employees’ health plan, and at a House hearing in 2023 he spoke up for PBMs based on the savings he saw as a buyer.

Whitehouse, a Democrat, made the case for PBMs at the Senate Finance Committee’s 2023 markup of a PBM bill. He suggested PBMs might be “the most powerful institutional counterweight to the pharmaceutical industry” and voted for the bill, which passed 26 to 1.

Sen. Rand Paul, a Kentucky Republican, has argued that restricting PBMs would weaken their bargaining with manufacturers, and that businesses would not hire PBMs if they raised costs.

Standing nearly alone

The few politicians who speak up for PBMs can find themselves nearly alone in public. Romney’s amendment never got a vote on its merits. The committee tabled it. Its chairman, Sen. Bernie Sanders, said that building the 60 votes the bill would eventually need was hard and that the amendment looked “fatal” to that effort. Later that day the committee approved the bill 18 to 3, and Romney and Paul were two of the three votes against it. When the House Oversight Committee approved the Pharmacists Fight Back Act, a PBM bill backed by independent pharmacists, 40 to 2 in July 2026, NCPA reported that Burlison was the only committee member who spoke against it.

Why the rail stays live

A PBM’s requirements become visible at the pharmacy counter, while the savings it produces are harder for plan members to recognize. Its strongest defense often rests with the purchasers that chose the arrangement. They have reason to defend their own flexibility rather than PBMs as an industry, and they can make that case more credibly than the PBM itself. Pharmacies and manufacturers, meanwhile, have organized constituencies. And a PBM is a useful target: Both parties can place blame on it instead of on interests with more protection, so speaking up for PBMs means taking that target away.

The few politicians who have touched the rail emphasized different reasons: a purchaser’s freedom to choose a contract; bargaining leverage against drug manufacturers; or savings a buyer had seen firsthand. A PBM can have customers who value what it does and still have no dependable defenders. Purchasers may speak up when their own interests are threatened, but a politician who defends PBMs more broadly cannot count on those purchasers to support that position.

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